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Abstract
In the West, press freedom is typically understood as self-evident – as part of a 
pervasive ideology rather than of a rational doctrine. Therefore, while cherish-
ing the idea of freedom, there is a need to deconstruct libertarian myths about 
press freedom. For instance, the metaphor of a free marketplace of ideas turns 
out to be something other than the original liberalism proposed by John Milton 
and John Stuart Mill. The history of ideas does not support a (neo)liberal 
notion of freedom, but rather a concept of freedom tied to moral values. Hence 
narrow-minded advocates of Western freedom are just as fundamentalist as 
those Islamists who are designated as such.
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Introduction
Freedom is a cornerstone that guides our ways of thinking about media and 
society. In the Western tradition, press freedom is typically understood as a 
self-evident concept – as part of a pervasive ideology rather than of a rational 
doctrine. For this reason, we are invited to take critical excursions into the 
concept of freedom, in general, and press freedom, in particular. 
I call this an exercise in deconstructing libertarian myths about press free-
dom. As a starter, we should recall the landmark documents that the inter-
national community (UN) adopted in the 1940s: the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 and the Constitution of UNESCO of 1945. These 
introduced an idea of media freedom that is quite balanced and far from the 
ultra-libertarian version conventionally held in dominant Western thinking 
– namely, that freedom means absence of state control. Indeed, international
law does not support a simple notion of negative liberty (freedom from) – fol-
lowing Isaiah Berlin’s well-known disctinction. What is suggested instead is a 
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notion of positive liberty (freedom for), whereby freedom is not an end prod-
uct to be protected as such but a means to ensure other more general objec-
tives, such as peace and democracy. Moreover, the subject of the right to free-
dom of expression is “everyone” – each individual – and not the media, which 
Western press proprietors typically present as the guarantors of freedom.
Legacy of liberalism
The core of the traditional notion of press freedom is the doctrine of a free 
marketplace of ideas. According to the doctrine, a free flow of information 
and ideas on this marketplace automatically ensures that truth will prevail, 
notably through a mechanism of self-correcting truth. This doctrine was given 
shape in 20th-century America, first in legal and political debates between the 
two World Wars and finally during the Cold War in the 1950s. However, going 
back to the classics of liberal thought, particularly to John Milton’s (1644) Are-
opagitica and John Stuart Mill’s (1859) On Liberty, it turns out that their think-
ing does not exactly correspond to the later doctrine. Hence, it is a myth to 
consider the free marketplace of ideas as part and parcel of original liberalism. 
In point of fact, the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas with a self-right-
ing truth, as it keeps circulating in the contemporary professional and aca-
demic discourse, cannot be found in the works of Milton and Mill. Although 
these classics of liberalism used the market metaphor, it was not understood 
as an appropriate way for individuals to approach the world of ideas. Actu-
ally, both were aghast at the prospect of ideas being treated as if they were 
goods to be bought and sold on a market. They certainly advocated freedom 
of thought and speech without prior censorship, but the concept of a free 
marketplace of ideas had no strategic place in their thinking. 
Milton’s main point was to oppose the licensing and censorship of printing. 
He insisted that all kinds of views should be allowed and should be brought to 
the public, where they could clash without hindrance. Today, his philosophi-
cal view would be called a maxim of pluralism, according to which we cannot 
find the truth without also encountering falsehood. Milton was passionately 
opposed to forbidding anything from being published; he compared censor-
ship to murder. In his main work, Paradise Lost, Milton (1667) elaborated the 
struggle between truth and falsehood and made a fervent appeal to challenge 
official truths, including God’s commandments, as a means to acquire know-
ledge and achieve human growth and development. 
Accordingly, truth will not automatically prevail, but must be cultivated 
through an active and radical process. This view is simply incompatible with 
the concept of self-righting truth. In short, Milton cannot be taken as an early 
advocate of market liberalism: “Call him radical, call him puritan, call him 
republican, but do not call him (neo)liberal” (Peters 2005: 72).
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John Stuart Mill, who minutely scrutinized what Milton had written two 
centuries earlier, shared Milton’s position on the free encounter of ideas and 
the impropriety of censorship. Mill’s On Liberty is a fine elaboration of the 
same theme, and it does not include the doctrine of a free marketplace of 
ideas. The rest of Mill’s production is likewise void of this concept. For a 
liberal, he was far from dogmatic about the role of the state, considering that 
state intervention may well be necessary in ensuring social justice and other 
higher values. Moreover, to Mill, freedom of opinion and expression was not 
an end in itself; he viewed it as “the necessity to the mental well-being of 
mankind (on which all their other well-being depends).” Thus, in his summary 
of the grounds for pursuing this freedom, he suggested that human well-being 
was the ultimate objective.
As to the concept of self-righting truth, Mill actually held a contrary view, 
according to which it was quite possible for truth to fail to prevail in a free 
encounter and for falsehood to become the dominant public opinion. In On 
Liberty, he dismissed the concept of self-righting truth as “pleasant falsehood.” 
Later, Mill had bitter personal experience of how falsehood may prevail: With 
his wife, Harriet Taylor-Mill, he fought for women’s emancipation, but failed 
to gain broader support and even became the object of ridicule, finally losing 
his seat in Parliament. 
Consequently, it is a myth that the standard practice of justifying press free-
dom using the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas comes from the classics 
of liberalism. The ideas of Milton and Mill do not provide direct support for 
contemporary neoliberalism and cannot be taken as the basis for a libertarian 
theory of the press. The legacy of original liberalism instead represents social 
democracy and corresponds to a social responsibility theory of the press pro-
posed by the Hutchins Commission in the United States (A Free and Respon-
sible Press 1947). The concept of freedom in the original liberal philosophy 
was positive rather than negative: freedom for something, not freedom from 
something.
Where, then, are the roots of the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas? 
An often-quoted source in the literature is the 1919 proceedings, held in New 
York, against Russian immigrants accused of distributing anti-American leaflets 
(supporting the socialist revolution of 1917). In this process, Judge Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes referred to a “free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” 
(Peters 2004: 71). However, as John Durham Peters pointed out, this was not, 
literally speaking, the doctrine and slogan of a free marketplace of ideas. 
Peters (2004) traced the first uses of the phrase “free marketplace of ideas” 
to the pages of The New York Times in the mundane political discourse of the 
1930s, but a more profound usage, prior to the 1948 Congressional election 
campaign, can be found in an unusual quarter: the communist party of the 
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United States, which wanted to campaign “in a free marketplace of ideas.” 
Obviously, American leftists employed the slogan as a defense against rising 
anticommunism. However, Peters (2004) showed that the Cold War context 
soon turned around the political sponsorship of the slogan and that, already 
in 1953, The New York Times used it as an argument against East European 
countries that employed censorship to prevent the emergence of a free mar-
ketplace of ideas.
In addition to this Cold War context, the free marketplace doctrine should 
also be seen as a politically appropriate response to the development of media 
structures in late capitalism. Because the commercialized and concentrated 
media market no longer guaranteed a genuine competition of ideas – some-
thing that had existed in the early modern era when each town had several 
competing newspapers – the monopolized media declared themselves a vir-
tual marketplace of ideas.
Freedom in perspective
Consequently, we can trace a centuries-long historical line, from the early 
modern age to the postmodern world, characterized by a surprisingly coher-
ent idea of freedom of information. In this context, liberalism is not a partisan 
ideology hijacked by U.S. diplomacy, but a balanced philosophy that is far 
from outdated. In media philosophies, the original liberal tradition is closer 
to what was advocated by the Hutchins Commission in the 1940s than to the 
manifestos of the World Press Freedom Committee in the 1970-80s.
It is instructive to view the concept of freedom in light of the philosophi-
cal traditions that can be traced behind the concept of power. In short, there 
are two fundamentally different notions of power: a Hobbesian view and a 
Hegelian view. 
The first of these traditions follows Thomas Hobbes and the Galilean meta-
phor of a universe of freely moving objects, including human beings and their 
will, where “freely” means the absence of external impediments to motion. In 
this tradition, power means impeding free movement – power is the capacity 
to block free movement.
The latter tradition, for its part, follows Hegelian-Kantian philosophy, in 
which human beings are shaped not merely by the laws of nature, but above 
all by moral reasoning. Marxism later shared more or less the same philoso-
phy. In this tradition, freedom means autonomy from nature and is based on 
the rational and moral capacity of human beings; freedom is not the ability 
to act according to one’s will without being hindered, but rather almost the 
opposite – it is the product of a human mind governed by moral judgments. 
The former tradition introduces an ontology, where power emerges as a 
fairly simple (negative) element, with freedom as its (positive) opposite. The 
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latter tradition, for its part, has an ontology, where power is not an obstacle 
that distracts natural movement, but an essential instrument to ensure moral-
ity and order in civil society and ultimately in the state.
The overall lesson here is that when freedom is applied to media, it is 
a notoriously problematic concept. Moreover, it is a deceptively ideological 
concept – especially when understood to be simple and apolitical. We must 
therefore be alert and critical if we are to avoid ideological traps – and the 
complacency that is fed by top rankings for press freedom in international 
comparisons. After all, we are always bound to a certain tradition, and our 
thinking – with all its concepts and paradigms – is constructed rather than 
inherently given.
On the other hand, a critical approach to the topic does not suggest that 
the idea of freedom – in general or applied to media – should be undermined 
or questioned. On the contrary, freedom of thought, expression, and media is 
cherished as a vital element in the lives of individuals as well as societies. It 
is precisely because of its great value that freedom should not be allowed to 
degenerate into an ideological instrument, as has too often been the case. To 
disprove the old myths and avoid the emergence of new ones, it is important 
that freedom, and the lack of it, remain a topic of constant debate.
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Note
1 Shortened from Nordenstreng 2013. Based on the author’s earlier publications in 2007, 2010 
and 2011. 
